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 Abstract 
This paper examines to what extent the classification of the American welfare state as 
“residual” squares with the empirical facts. Section I describes key features of American 
social policy developments. The U.S. system is clearly dominated by public provisions 
for welfare among which social insurance programs, especially Social Security and 
Medicare, represent the lion’s share, and public pensions are more universal, redistribu-
tive, and generous than in some European countries. Noteworthy differences remain 
with respect to the stronger reliance on private provisions in pensions and health, the 
emphasis on work-conditioned benefits and a greater importance of selective schemes. 
The terms “work-conditioned welfare” or “corporate citizenship” adequately capture 
these key features by highlighting that employers are gatekeepers of social entitlements. 
Section II examines if key features of the American welfare state have recently become 
more prominent in Europe. A slight approximation to the American model is found with 
respect to a growing importance of private expenditure for pensions and health, but not 
with respect to a greater selectivity of benefits. On the level of policy discourse, the idée 
directrice of European social policies is changing from social protection to activation, 
as three traditionally American elements have come to prominence: an emphasis on 
individual responsibility, on the private supply of services and more consumer choice, 
and on the activation of people at working age. Yet there is no general convergence to-
wards the American model, because the United States is approximating Europe with 
respect to health insurance while public attitudes are shifting in favour of extended state 
responsibilities. Hence there is a complex pattern of specific policy learning rather than 
convergence towards one model of social policy. In sum, similarities between social 
policies in Europe and America are found to be more noteworthy than the term “residual 
welfare state” for the U.S. suggests. 
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The misperception of the American welfare state as  
“residual” 
Welfare state typologies usually classify the United States as a liberal or residual wel-
fare state. In this type of welfare state means-tested assistance, modest universal trans-
fers and modest social insurance plans are said to predominate, so that the welfare state 
caters essentially to the working class and the poor, while private insurance and occupa-
tional fringe benefits cater to the middle classes (Esping-Andersen 1990: 26, 31). The 
image implied in this typology is that the American welfare state is a laggard, both in 
the sense of arriving late on the historical stage, and of providing only limited benefits 
of stingy magnitude up to the present. Compared to European nations which are said to 
adhere to the “European social model”, the U.S. is thus characterized as an opposite 
polar type representing a different kind of social model.   
Several scholars have taken issue with this notion arguing that the American welfare 
state is “not incomplete, but different” (Glazer 1988), that it is “misunderstood” (Mar-
mor/Mashaw/Heady 1990), and that there is a “hidden welfare state” of tax benefits and 
mandatory private schemes in the United States of which European scholars barely take 
notice (Howard 1997). More recently, Neil Gilbert (2002) argued, that far from being a 
laggard the American welfare state should actually be seen as the harbinger of the future 
leading European countries on the way to an “enabling state” which empowers people 
by making them self-reliant. In his more recent work, Esping-Andersen partly sub-
scribed to this idea, as he no longer considered “de-commodification”, but “de-
familialization” as the key problem of our times, and advocated shifting to a new wel-
fare state which would focus on social services and on “social inclusion through em-
ployment” (Esping-Andersen et al. 2002; see also Taylor-Gooby 2004). In the United 
States Christopher Howard (2007) set out to debunk myths about American social pol-
icy in a book entitled “About the Welfare State Nobody Knows” which highlighted the 
vast recent growth of American social programs which European scholars tend to over-
look in their search for counterparts of European schemes in the United States. 
This contribution takes a fresh and synthetic look at similarities and differences of 
social policies in Europe and the United States. It proceeds in three steps. First, I will 
outline some key characteristics of the American welfare state. In a second step, I will 
analyze if recent developments signal convergence in the sense of an “Americanization 
of European social policies” as claimed by Neil Gilbert. In a third step, I conclude that 
even though relevant differences remain, the United States and Europe have far more in 
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common than the traditional distinction between “residual” and “institutional-redis-
tributive” welfare states suggests.1  
Key characteristics: Gross and net social spending  
In recent years the argument that the American welfare state is not incomplete but dif-
ferent has been promoted most forcefully by the OECD in Paris, where Willem Adema 
and his collaborators have made an admirable attempt to track more comprehensively 
what welfare states actually do by distinguishing between gross and net social spending 
(Adema and Ladaïque 2005). The former yardstick is traditionally used in welfare state 
comparisons based on social outlays, the latter takes four additional aspects into ac-
count: (1) the fact that welfare states frequently claw back what they spend by taxing 
benefits; (2) the fact that there are indirect tax benefits which support groups by grant-
ing them certain exemptions or privileges in taxation; (3) the fact that governments may 
mandate private employers to provide certain benefits, and (4) the fact that there are 
varying degrees of voluntary social activities such as private charity. 
Once the impact of taxes and publicly mandated schemes is taken into account, the 
United States no longer falls far behind most European countries but moves closer to 
the middle of the pack, becoming almost indistinguishable from such European coun-
tries as Spain, the Czech Republic, Poland, or the Netherlands and far ahead of Ireland 
and Slovakia. If voluntary private spending is included, the United States even moves 
far above the European average of social spending and belongs to the group of the most 
lavish social spenders, topped only by five European countries (France, Belgium, Ger-
many, Sweden, and the United Kingdom – Figure 1). This, of course, has dual and am-
bivalent policy implications. On the one hand it highlights that the U.S. does not repre-
sent a socially unbridled form of pure capitalism, but is rather similar to European coun-
tries which pride themselves for the social elements they add to the market economy. 
On the other hand, it also means that a limitation of welfare state responsibilities does 
not liberate society from social costs. Social risks which are not or no longer provided 
for by the state impinge either on firms – which have to provide occupational welfare – 
or on private households which have to carry the costs from their private purse thus 
curbing their disposable income. Consequently, social costs accrue anyhow, but they are 
merely borne at another level which usually implies that they are less equally distributed 
than in the case of public schemes with universal coverage (Alber 2006).  
 
                                                 
1  As the focus here is on the benefit side of social transfer programs, different levels or structures of 
financing are not dealt with. The share of total tax revenues in GDP  grew from 27.3 % to 28.0 % in 
the U.S and from 38.2 to 39.8 % in the EU-15 in the period 1990-2006, thus leading to a widening 
gap between Europe and America (OECD 2008).  
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Figure 1: Gross and net social expenditure 2005
In percentage of GDP at factor cost
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Source: OECD (2009) Social expenditure database 
 
Figure 2: Private share of social expenditure for pensions and health 2005
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Own calculations based on OECD (2009) Social expenditure database 
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Differences in the composition of social spending become further evident if we take a 
closer look at the two biggest spending social programs, i.e. pension and health insur-
ance schemes (Figure 2). The U.S. is the only country which stands apart in both di-
mensions for its high share of private spending in 2005. With respect to pensions, most 
European countries limit the private share to less than 10 %, and the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom are the only European nations which come close to the American 
level of private spending. In health care spending, the private share in the U.S is more 
than twice as high as in the Netherlands which stands out as the European frontrunner 
with respect to privatized health spending.  
 
 
Table 1:  Participation rates in employee benefits in the U.S., 1980 and 2008  
 
 Health benefits Dental benefits Retirement plans
(all types) 
Defined benefit 
retirement plans 
 Total Private 
sector 
Public 
sector 
Total Private 
sector 
Public 
sector  
Total Private 
sector 
Public 
sector 
Total Private 
sector 
Public 
sector 
1980  97*         83*  
1986  95* 94*        76* 93* 
1994/95 61 58 79 37 34 58 57 51 91 36 28 86 
2007  52 
62* 
  36 
49* 
  51 
66* 
  20 
32* 
 
2008 56 
67* 
53 
65* 
73 
74* 
   56 
72*
51 
67* 
86 
88* 
   
 
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics: Employee Benefits in the United States; 
eds. 1980, 1988, 1994-95, 2007, 2008. Consistent time-series are not available; the 1980 and 1986 sur-
veys covered only medium and large firms in the private sector; data since 1994/95 refer to all establish-
ments (bold and with asterisk symbol: only establishments with 100 workers or more). The difference be-
tween "health insurance for participant" and "non-contributory" schemes provided at no cost to employees 
is no longer made consistently in later years; the percentage of workers with non-contributory health bene-
fits in 1980 was 72 %; in 2007 24 % of participating employees were in schemes not requiring an em-
ployee contribution; since a total of 52 % participated, this would mean that 12.5 % did not have to pay 
contributions, as compared to 72 % in 1980. 
Reading examples: The percentage of workers in medium or large private industry firms (100 workers or 
more) who participated in retirement schemes with defined benefits declined from 83 % in 1980 to 32 % in 
2007. The percentage of workers covered for major medical benefits in private sector establishments of 
comparable size decreased from 97 % in 1980 to 65 % in 2008. Major medical benefits usually include 
hospital care, but frequently not dental care as illustrated by the data for 1994/95. Data on participation 
should not be confounded with the much higher data on access, because not all workers who have access 
decide to actually take-up the benefit.  
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The high levels of private spending are due to the fact that most American workers 
belong to employee benefit schemes tied to their work-place. Thus, in 2008, more than 
half of all civilian employees participated in an employer- or union-provided retirement 
program, while also more than one half had employment-related health benefits (Table 
1). In middle and large establishments coverage ratios are even close to two thirds. 
Compared to the situation in the 1980s, there is, however, a drastic decline in the per-
centage of covered employees as well as a shift to contribution defined occupational 
retirement plans, a trend which Hacker (2006) has described as the ”great risk shift”. In 
sum, the data on private benefits underline the idea that the American welfare is not so 
much “incomplete” as relying on different and diverse tools of social support (Howard 
2007). 
The exaggerated bifurcation into universal and residual programs in 
the U.S. 
According to the concept of the “residual” welfare state, American social policies are 
bifurcated into a rather limited social insurance branch for the middle classes on the one 
side whose stingy benefits leave ample leeway for the private insurance sector, and a 
rather big selective welfare branch with targeted benefits for the poor who belong to 
certain “deserving” social categories – such as a the blind, the disabled or the children 
of poor people – on the other who pass rather stingy means-tests. Serving the well-
organized middle classes, the former are said to be fairly backlash-prone, whereas the 
latter are supposedly more likely to become subject to curtailments. An inspection of 
the composition and growth of social spending in these categories helps to clarify to 
what extent this image is an appropriate characterization of the American welfare state.   
Figure 3 shows what proportion of total transfer payments went to specific schemes. 
This reveals that the American welfare state is clearly dominated by social insurance 
schemes, which comprise above all two big schemes for elderly persons, i.e. Social Se-
curity and Medicare. Together with more minor programs such as unemployment insur-
ance and workmen’s compensation these schemes devour about two thirds of social 
spending in the United States. Over time their share remained fairly stable decreasing 
only slightly from roughly 67 % in 1980 to about 64 % in 2006. As the bulk of the 
American welfare state budget is thus spent on social insurance schemes incorporating 
the middle classes, the label “residual” does not adequately represent the American sys-
tem. Including the Medicaid scheme and especially due to its steep recent growth, the 
share of targeted schemes for the poorer part of the population including the Earned 
Income Tax Credit increased from roughly 23 % in 1980 to over 30 % in 2006. Even 
though targeted at the poor, both Medicaid and the Earned Income Tax Credit have en-
joyed widespread political support which sustained their growth. Disregarding Medi-
What the European and American welfare states have in common and where they differ 
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caid, whose coverage has been successively widened, the share of selective schemes 
would have declined from 13 to slightly over 10 %. The “Other” category which in-
cludes categorical schemes for specific groups such as veterans’ benefits decreased in 
relative importance.  
 
 
Figure 3: The distribution of transfer payments by type in the U.S., 1980-2006
53,2%
48,3%
42,5%
38,2%
13,7%
19,2%
21,6%
26,0%
9,7%
13,9% 20,1% 20,1%
13,0%
11,3%
10,5% 10,4%
10,3% 7,3%
5,3% 5,4%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1980 1990 2000 2006
Targeted Programs 
(incl. EITC + TANF)
Social Insurance 
Schemes (excl. 
Medicare)
Other
Medicaid
Medicare
Source: Own Calculations based on Statistical Abstract of the United States 2009 (Tables 512 und 645)  
 
The development of the single component programs is better illustrated by their chang-
ing GDP shares (Figure 4). Disregarding Medicare, the various social insurance 
schemes have grown slower than GDP over the past decades, while the Medicare and 
Medicaid schemes saw over-proportionate growth. Together they have now by far over-
taken all other social insurance schemes combined, while the selective programs other 
than Medicaid remained limited to roughly 1 % of GDP. Health-related expenditures 
have thus been the main drivers of change, regardless of whether they were more selec-
tively targeted on the poor as the Medicaid program or more universal in design as the 
Medicare scheme for the elderly population. Broadly based social insurance schemes – 
Social Security and Medicare – thus continue to represent the lion’s share of the Ameri-
can welfare state, and in this respect the United States is similar to European welfare 
states which are also increasingly dominated by pension and health expenditure.  
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Figure 4: GDP shares of various transfer programs in the U.S., 1980-2005
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Attempts to contrast the “European Social Model” with the U.S. usually contain three 
more fine-grained stereotypes which can be confronted with the empirical facts. The 
first one holds that the American welfare state lacks two schemes that European welfare 
states typically have – a public health insurance program and a minimum income 
scheme effectively safeguarding against poverty – while its biggest program, public 
pensions, is supposedly more stingy and of much more limited size than its European 
counterparts.2  
                                                 
2  For different accounts contrasting the European Social Model with the American model see Wickham 
(2002), Vaughan-Whitehead (2003, esp. chapters 1 and 3), Jouen and Papant (2005), Jepsen and Pas-
cual (2005), Alber (2006), Castles (2009), Alber and Gilbert (2009). The idea of a stark contrast has 
perhaps found its bluntest expression in a phrase by a frequent advisor to the Commission stating: 
“The simplest difference between the USA and Europe is that we have welfare states, they do not.” 
(Wickham 2002: 1). More detailed accounts focussing on minimum income schemes or health care 
are given by Saraceno (2009) and Blank (2009) for anti-poverty programs and by Hacker (2009) for 
health care. 
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More specific comparisons with respect to three widely held Euro-
pean stereotypes 
The most widely held European stereotype concerning American social policies is that 
the U.S. does not have public health insurance. Even though it is true that a universal 
sickness insurance scheme is absent, as the major public programs, Medicaid and Medi-
care, are categorical schemes geared to specific groups, several qualifications are in 
place. In terms of expenditure, the U.S. spends a similarly high GDP share on public 
health care programs as high-spending European nations. The three leading sources on 
comparative health care spending – the OECD Social Expenditure Data Base (OECD 
2009), the COFOG Classification of Functions of Government Data Base (Fraser and 
Norris 2007; Castles 2009), and the World Health Statistics published by the World 
Health Organization (2008) – differ with respect to details, but all lead similarly to the 
result that public outlays on health care are higher in the U.S. than in most EU member 
states.3 Taken together, the two major American public health care programs – Medi-
care and Medicaid – now spend almost just as much as the statutory sickness insurance 
scheme of the European country with the oldest public health insurance scheme in the 
world, i.e. Germany (where the public insurance scheme dates from 1883). In 1990, 
Germany’s sickness insurance scheme still spent almost twice as much as the two 
American programs (6.0 % compared to 3.2 % of GDP), but in subsequent years the 
U.S. closed up so that spending levels in the two countries were almost on par in 2006 
(6.0 % in Germany, 5.4 % in the U.S.).  
Once again, this is a finding with ambivalent policy implications. On the one hand 
and contrary to the image of a residual welfare state, we see that the U.S. spends more 
on public health care than most European countries. On the other hand, at a similar level 
of spending, the German sickness insurance scheme achieves wider coverage insuring 
almost everybody in dependent employment as well as the pensioner population, and it 
also provides more comprehensive benefits including hospitals, and ambulatory and 
dental care. If the more restricted Medicare and Medicaid schemes in the U.S. now ap-
proximate the same level of spending, this is above all due to the higher cost of medical 
services in America. In addition, extensions of coverage also played a role, however. 
The Medicaid program was continuously opened to additional groups so that the num-
ber of children covered doubled from almost 9 to almost 19 million between 1980 and 
2000. Since the late 1990s, practically every second birth in the U.S. has been paid by 
Medicaid (Howard 2007: 98; Table 5.1, p. 97).  
                                                 
3  The COFOG data presented by Fraser and Norris have the U.S. ahead of all EU member states, the 
OECD SOCX  data base has only Belgium, Sweden, France, and Germany ahead of the U.S., and ac-
cording to WHO statistics only six European countries (Germany, Sweden, France, Denmark, Malta, 
and the United Kingdom) spend higher shares of GDP on public health programs than the U.S. (The 
WHO states the total health expenditure ratio and the proportion of public spending in this ratio thus 
allowing to calculate the public health expenditure ratio from its data.)  
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The major weakness of the American health care system is the large and growing 
number of people who remain uninsured. The percentage of uninsured Americans in-
creased from barely 12 % in 1987 to above 15 % in 2007.4 Roughly 46 million Ameri-
cans are presently without health insurance coverage (U.S. Census Bureau 2008). The 
U.S. health care system basically consists of four tiers: (1) Medicaid for the poor popu-
lation below an income-limit; (2) Medicare for the elderly; (3) Employment-related 
health care plans for people in the labour force (with special plans for people in the 
armed forces); (4) a rather large group of people below retirement age without any in-
surance coverage.5 This segmented organization also implies that there is a marked in-
come gradient in health insurance coverage: Only 8 % of people in the high-income 
category ($75,000 +), but 25 % of people in the low-income category (with household 
income below $ 25,000) are uninsured (U.S. Census Bureau 2008, p. 22). This is an 
indication that the Medicaid scheme falls short of achieving a comprehensive coverage 
of the poor population.  
It must be noted, however, that people without insurance are not necessarily perma-
nently or chronically uninsured in the United States. Given the frequent moves into and 
out of unemployment in the flexible American labour market (Freeman 2009), there is 
actually considerable turnover in the uninsured population. A panel study based on data 
for the periods 1987-89 and 1990-92 found that the typical uninsured spell lasted 
roughly 8 months for the uninsured poor and roughly 6 months for the uninsured non-
poor. It concluded that 32 % of the uninsured of the 1990 panel had uninsured spells 
which lasted longer than one year (McBride 1997). A biennial health insurance survey 
conducted by the Commonwealth Fund in 2005-06 found a higher prevalence of chroni-
cally uninsured people. 28 % of U.S. adults aged 19 to 64 were either uninsured at the 
time of the survey or had experienced a time without coverage in the past 12 months 
(Collins et al. 2006: 2). Of the nearly 32 million adults who were uninsured at the time 
of the survey, 82 % said they had been uninsured for one year or more (Ibid.: 4). More 
than 40 % of the uninsured said they had problems paying or were unable to pay medi-
cal bills in the past year, and even among those insured all year, 16 % reported such 
problems (Ibid.: Table 2, p. 20). A 2001 survey of personal bankruptcy filers in five 
federal courts found that more than half (54.5 %) cited a medical cause for bankruptcy 
(Himmelstein et al. 2005: W5-67).  
Based on the Census Bureau’s Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) 
in 2002 and 2003, a report by Families USA (2004) showed that the number of unin-
                                                 
4  For historical data since 1987 see Historical Health Tables, 
www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/historic/hlthin05/hihistt1.html and U.S. Census Bureau 2008, 
Table 6. 
5  In 2007 27.8 % were covered by a government health care plan, including Medicare (13.8 %), Medi-
caid (13.2 %), and Military health care (3.7 %). Roughly two thirds (67.5 %) were covered by private 
plans including directly purchased ones, and 59.3 % participated in an employment-related health in-
surance plan. 15.3 % (45.7 million) were not covered by any scheme. These figures do not add up to 
100, because the estimates by type of coverage are not mutually exclusive, as people can be covered 
by more than one type of health insurance during the year (U.S. Census Bureau 2008: 21). 
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sured Americans is higher than the Census Bureau’s data suggest once the focus is 
shifted from those without health insurance in the previous calendar year to those who 
were without insurance for all or part of a two year period in 2002 and 2003. Approxi-
mately 82 million people – or 32.2 % of those under the age of 65 – were without health 
insurance for all or part of these two years, and among these two-thirds (65.3 %) were 
uninsured for six months or more (Families USA 2004). The report stressed that con-
trary to popular belief Medicaid does not provide coverage to most workers in low-
wage jobs. As eligibility standards vary widely from state to state, a parent in a family 
of three working full time all year at the federal minimum wage would earn too much to 
qualify for Medicaid in half of the states.  
In sum, Europeans may overestimate the absence of public health care in the United 
States as well as the permanence of lacking insurance coverage, but the comparatively 
high level of public health care spending in the U.S. does go together with a compara-
tively wide gap in health insurance coverage despite the existence of various public and 
employment-related schemes.6 Until recently the awareness of this problem was rather 
under-developed in the U.S. Thus, a Congressional Research Service Report which 
aimed at clarifying why the U.S. spends more money on health care than any other 
OECD country drew attention to such factors as higher prices due to the better pay for 
health professionals but did not discuss the American paradox of high spending coupled 
with low health care coverage (Peterson and Burton 2007). 
A second widely shared stereotype holds that the U.S. has only a limited public pen-
sion scheme, as public programs must leave sufficient leeway for private insurance 
companies catering to the needs of the middle classes. This image was early transported 
by Esping-Andersen (1990) and was later re-iterated by scholars and journalists alike.7 
Crude comparisons of the GDP shares of public pensions seem to sustain this notion, as 
the old age pension expenditure ratio in the leading European countries – Austria 
(12.6 %), Italy (11.6 %) and Germany (11.2 %) – is more than twice as high as the 
American one (5.3 %) which has been stagnant in recent decades. A closer examination 
reveals, however, that the different GDP shares of pensions in Germany and the U.S. 
are not the consequence of the more generous design of the German scheme, but above 
all of the different demographic and economic situation in the two countries. In 2007, 
the percentage of elderly people aged 65 or older was 20.1 % in Germany, but only 
12.6 % in the U.S. On the other hand, the American GDP per capita, measured at pur-
chasing power parities, was 137 % of the German level in 2006. In other words, the 
GDP share of pensions in the U.S. is calculated on the basis of a smaller numerator due 
to a much smaller number of people above retirement age and of a larger denominator. 
                                                 
6  OECD data showing the much wider coverage of European sickness insurance schemes are summa-
rized in a useful comparative table by Hacker (2009).  
7  For a typical example taking it for granted that old age security has always been less developed in the 
U.S. than in Germany see Schimank (2007: 56). For a recent comparison based on OECD statistics 
and the Comparative Welfare Entitlement Dataset by Scruggs (2005) see Starke, Castles and Obinger 
(2008). 
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If all factors were equal, one would expect the German GDP share of pensions to be at 
only 63 % of the present level on account of the smaller numerator and 37 % smaller on 
account of the larger denominator. Both aspects combined would mean that the German 
GPD share of pensions would shrink from 11.2 to 7.0 % because of the demographic 
factor and would be reduced further to merely 5.1 % if the German GDP were as high as 
the American one. 
If we look at the institutional regulations, the American social security scheme is in 
fact more universal in coverage, more redistributive in its benefit formula where re-
placement rates vary inversely with earnings8, and at least as generous in its benefit lev-
els as its German counterpart.9 Table 2 illustrates this with respect to the level of bene-
fits. Measured at purchasing power parities in international dollars, the average pension 
in the United States is 13 % higher than the average pension (per person) in Germany. 
Even the so-called German “standard pension” which a model retiree receives who has 
worked for 45 years at average earnings is lower than the average retirement income for 
American couples. Most German retirees receive much less than this “standard pen-
sion”, however, because they have worked for shorter periods (men 41 years, women 29 
years on average) or had earnings-records below the average.10 
A third widely held stereotype holds that the U.S. does not have a general social as-
sistance scheme which would entitle citizens to a minimum income as in Europe. Dis-
cussing this stereotype Chiara Saraceno (2009) recently showed that such minimum 
income schemes do not exist in all EU member states either. The existing American 
poor relief schemes do deviate in several respects from their European counterparts, 
however. First, not all indigent people can make a claim to poor relief in the U.S., as 
benefits are usually reserved for certain “deserving” categories such as mothers, or blind 
or disabled persons, whereas the able-bodied people at working age are expected to 
support themselves. Hence both classical “welfare” programs, the AFDC scheme (Aid 
for Families with Dependent Children) and the TANF scheme (Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families) which replaced it were targeted at families with children. Secondly, 
benefits in kind such as Food Stamps and work-conditioned benefits tend to play a more 
prominent role than in Europe (Blank 2009). Thirdly, American welfare benefits were 
never designed to push people above the official federal poverty line, but are merely 
meant to supplement other sources of income, while the generosity of benefits varies 
widely from state to state where the payment standards usually fall short of the need 
                                                 
8  The 2003 earnings replacement rates for people in different income brackets were as follows: 41,6 % 
for average earners (percentage of last earnings in case of life long average earnings); 56,1 % for low 
incomes (with 45 % of average earnings); 29,8 % for high income/maximum earnings (maximum 
earnings correspond to about 3.3 times the average earnings in social security - U. S. House of Repre-
sentatives, Committee on Ways and Means, 2004, p. 1-45, 1-48 und p. 1-50. 
9  The Comparative Welfare Entitlement Dataset (Scruggs 2005) states the net average replacement 
ratio (for life time average earners in 2000) as 67 % in the U.S. and 64 % in Germany, with 58 % in 
the U.S. and 74 % in Germany for singles, and 76 % (U.S.) vs. 58 % (G) for couples.  
10  Mean earnings for men were 103.8 % of the average, for women 78.4 %, and 89 % on aggregate for 
both (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales 2008, pp. 20 and Übersicht 6). 
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standards defining eligibility. It is true that the EU member states do not make the sta-
tistical poverty line – i.e. the at-risk-of-poverty threshold drawn at 60 % of national me-
dian earnings – the basis of an entitlement to minimum subsistence either, as national 
benefits are well below this level (Saraceno 2009), but the American poverty line – 
which varies with household size – is drawn at a much lower level corresponding to 
only about 40 % of the median national equivalent income for singles. A comparison of 
the rates in the German social assistance scheme and the combined rates of the TANF 
and Food Stamps programs illustrates the difference: Welfare entitlements in the United 
States remain not only far below the official poverty line, but are also stingier relative to 
the national median equivalent income than in Germany (Figure 5).11   
 
 
Table 2: Pension levels in the United States and Germany, 2006 
 
 USA Germany 
Average monthly benefit for 
retired worker 
$ 1.044 € 805,61 (per person)1 
($ 923.57) 
Average for retired couple 
(worker and wife) 
$ 1.726  
   
German net "standard pen-
sion" (if 45 years of insurance 
and life time average earnings) 
 € 1067 (West - net) 
($ 1223.36) 
€ 1176 (West - gross) 
($1348.34) 
 
Sources: U.S.: Statistical Abstract of the United States 2009, Table 526 
 Germany: Rentenversicherungsbericht 2008, p. 18-19 
 Conversion rate German € in international dollars at PPP: 1.1465455 
1 2007: the average per each individual pension case is € 718,20 ($ 823.45) 
 
The more limited character of poverty relief must be seen in combination with two other 
factors, however. First, the United States has a legislated minimum wage, and secondly, 
wages in the low-wage sector are supplemented by the Earned Income Tax Credit which 
grew sizably over the past two decades. The development of the federal minimum wage, 
which may be modified by state legislation, is shown in Figure 6. As the rates are not 
indexed for inflation and remained unchanged for almost a decade, the real value of the 
minimum wage declined by one third between 1980 and 2006. The three subsequent 
years then saw annual increases.  
                                                 
11  It must be noted, however, that the two major American benefits need not be the only benefits, as 
they may be supplemented by other forms of assistance such as housing or heating subsidies. 
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Figure 5: The relationship of minimum subsistence benefits and of the U.S. poverty threshold to the 
national median equivalent household income, 2003
D
 Social Assistance 
Benefit 
22.6%
D 
Soc. Assist. 
Benefit
36.9%
D 
Soc. Assistance 
Benefit
55.8%
US 
Maximum Benefit 
(TANF+
Food Stamps)
17.7%
US 
Max. Benefit
27.6%
US 
Max. Benefit
 44.7%
US 
Poverty threshold
41.4%
US 
Poverty threshold
55.9%
US Poverty threshold 
 82.2%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Single One adult with one child under 18 Couple with two kids under 18
Own calculations based on: USA: Green Book (online:http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/threshld.html) and PSID (disposable 
income weighted by square root of hh-size). DE: Bundesministerium für Gesundheit und Soziale Sicherung (Sozialhilferegelsatz plus 
Wohnkostenzuschuss und einmalige Leistungen) and GSOEP (disposable income weighted by square root of hh-size).  
 
 
Figure 6: The development of Minimum Wage Rates in the United States, 1980-2007
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Figure 7: The functioning of the Earned Income Tax Credit for a family with two children, 2007
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While the minimum wage declined, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC or EIC) aimed 
at making work pay and was considerably expanded in recent years, thus making it one 
of the fastest growing social programs. The credit is a Federal government program 
which may be supplemented by similar schemes on the state level. Created in 1975, it is 
available to low-income tax payers. Originally limited to families with dependent chil-
dren, its coverage was extended in 1993 to also include childless workers with low in-
come. Designed to strengthen work incentives, the scheme grants a refundable tax credit 
which is calculated as a percentage of earnings up to a certain limit. The credit thus in-
creases with earned income until it reaches its maximum amount at a certain level of 
earnings. This income limit is called “minimum income for maximum credit” or “limit 
on creditable earnings”. For incomes beyond this limit the credit remains constant until 
a second income threshold is reached beyond which the credit is reduced by a certain 
phaseout percentage (i.e. percent of earnings above the threshold), until a “break-even” 
point is reached at which the credit is reduced to zero. All EITC-income-limits have 
been indexed to inflation since 1986. The income limit on creditable earnings at which 
the maximum credit is reached for a family with two children roughly corresponds to 
the poverty threshold for unrelated individuals (2006: 110 %, i.e. $ 11.340 compared to 
$ 10.294). The threshold at which phaseout begins for such a family (2006: $ 14.810) 
corresponds to about 40 % of the average earnings in social security (which stood at 
$ 37.601). The break even-point is slightly below the level of average earnings in social 
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security (96 % – see Figure 7). Varying with the number of children, the threshold is 
more than twice as high for families with two children as for childless workers.  
In 2006, the maximum credit amounted to $ 378 per month ($ 4536 a year). 23 mil-
lion families received a credit which amounted to $ 160 per month on average ($ 1926 
per year). Figure 8 shows the steep growth of the EITC which enjoys high popularity 
among politicians and tax payers alike. The number of recipient families grew almost 
fourfold from around 6 million in the 1970s to above 23 million in recent years, while 
the total cost of the credit even increased by factor 35 and amounted to more than § 44 
billion in 2006. In sum, the American welfare state combines a variety of different tools 
to provide a minimum floor which are difficult to compare with minimum income secu-
rity schemes in Europe. Instead of one general social assistance scheme, there is patch-
work of several programs most of which are strongly work-conditioned and aim at sup-
porting people with low earnings from work.  
 
 
Figure 8: Earned Income Tax Credit expenditure (as % of GDP) and recipient families 
(as % of all households), 1975-2006
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The major insights from this short description of the American welfare state may be 
summarized in three points: First, in many respects the American welfare state is differ-
ent rather than incomplete, because it uses a host of different instruments including not 
only social insurance, but also minimum wage legislation, tax credits for the working 
poor, as well as sum other measures not described here such as loan guarantees and 
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other subsidies in housing, regulation of employment conditions, and tort law (Howard 
2007). Second, within the realm of social security the American welfare state is more 
similar to European welfare states than the term “residual welfare state” suggests, be-
cause it is also dominated by public provisions for welfare among which social insur-
ance programs, especially Social Security and Medicare, predominate, it is more univer-
sal, redistributive, and generous in its public pension scheme than the German pension 
insurance system, it is growing over time also in recent decades, and moving closer to 
Europe with respect to extended public health care schemes. Third, noteworthy differ-
ences to Europe remain, most notably a stronger reliance on private schemes in pen-
sions and health, a stronger emphasis on work-conditioned benefits, thus assigning im-
portant gatekeeper roles to employers, a greater importance of selective or targeted 
schemes which represent about one third of total social spending in the American wel-
fare state if Medicaid is included.  
In short, this suggests that the term “residual welfare state” is misleading, because it 
conceals important similarities in European and American social policies as well as 
some American peculiarities which a typology based on a quantification of more or less 
in identical dimensions cannot reflect. In order to characterize this model of social poli-
cies, various terms have been proposed in the literature which all seem to capture rele-
vant features better than the term “residual welfare state” does. These concepts include: 
the industrial achievement-performance model (a term which Titmuss (1974) used to 
characterize continental European welfare states); the opportunity-insurance state 
(Marmor/Mashaw/Harvey 1990); the enabling state (Gilbert 2002); the work-
conditioned public support state (Blank 2009). Since the element of work incentives is 
an implicit component of all of these proposals, I think that the term “work-
conditioned” welfare state which Rebecca Blank has suggested is particularly telling, 
because it implicitly draws attention to one important element: Since many benefits are 
tied to work – apart from the contribution-based insurance schemes also the minimum 
wage, the Earned Income Tax Credit, the heavily subsidized employee benefits – em-
ployers function as key gatekeepers of social entitlements. In this sense, the American 
welfare state is less based on social citizenship and on state bureaucracies administering 
the programs, but on what Dobbin (2002) has called “corporatized social citizenship”. 
In this system the work contract with private employers is used as the basis of social 
protection, and this also means that the loss of a job is punished twice, because not only 
earnings from work but also social rights are forgone.   
“Americanization” would then mean that some of the peculiar features of the Ameri-
can welfare state become adopted or strengthened in other countries as well so that they 
converge with the United States. In the following I will examine if European welfare 
states have moved closer to the American case with respect to the following features: 
the level of gross social spending; the proportion of private benefits, and the relative 
share of selective means-tested benefits. In addition, we will examine if the American 
welfare state has become more radically American itself with respect to these features. 
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Recent social policy changes in Europe and the U.S. 
Aggregate social spending 
Table 3 shows that social expenditure kept growing not only in the United States but 
also in most European OECD member states after 1980. On average, social spending 
was higher in 2005 than in 1980 or in 1990. Only six of the fifteen old member states of 
the EU saw a moderate downward trend in social spending between 1990 and 2006 
(Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Spain, Luxembourg, Netherlands).12 The pattern is some-
what different for the new member states, where seven out of twelve countries reduced 
social spending relative to GDP. On average the trend in social spending up to 2006 is 
moderately positive in the EU-15, moderately negative in the 12 new member states and 
zero on average. In sum, we neither see general welfare state shrinkage nor a converg-
ing race to the bottom, but a widening gap between old and new member states of the 
EU. Differences between the EU-15 and the United States have not narrowed, but wid-
ened over time.13  
As discussed earlier, the gross social expenditure ratio is only a crude measure of 
welfare state activities which cannot capture important differences in the composition of 
social spending. Hence we should examine if European countries have become more 
similar to the U.S. with respect to specific characteristics such as the level of private 
spending for social purposes or the relative weight of selective targeted schemes. 
 
 
                                                 
12  The trend coefficients are the bs of a linear regression over time.   
13  For similar results based on less recent data see Starke, Obinger and Castles 2008, and Castles 2009. 
Comparisons between the enlarged EU and the U.S. are impaired by the fact that the Eurostat defini-
tion of social expenditure differs from the OECD definition while the OECD data base has only data 
for four of the new EU member states (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia). 
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Table 3: The development of gross social expenditure rates (% of GDP)  
 (shaded = declining) 
 
 Levels OECD Levels Eurostat Trends (b coeff.) 
Country 1980 1990 2005 
1990  
(or earliest 
data) 
2006 
OECD 
 
1980-
2005 
OECD 
 
1990-
2005 
Eurost.
 
1990-
2006 
USA 13,1 13,4 15,9   0,12 0,11  
EU-15 19,5 21,4 24,3 24,0 25,4 0,15 0,08 0,05 
NMS  17,7 19,9 16,5 16,4  0,11 -0,08 
EU-27 19,5 20,6 23,3 20,7 21,4 0,15 0,08 0,00 
Stand. dev.  
EU-15  
EU-27 (EU-19) 
5,08 
 
4,76 
(4,63) 
3,63 
(3,82)
4,95 
5,64 
3,79 
5,79    
Coeff. of var.  
EU-15 
EU-27 (EU-19) 
0,26 
 
0,22 
(0,22) 
0,15 
(0,16)
0,21 
0,27 
0,15 
0,27    
Denmark 24,8 25,1 26,9 27,4 28,3 0,14 0,00 -0,02 
Finland 18,0 24,2 26,1 23,8 25,4 0,30 -0,42 -0,36 
Sweden 27,1 30,2 29,4 36,9 (1993) 30,0 0,08 -0,30 -0,37 
Austria 22,5 23,9 27,2 25,3 27,6 0,20 0,19 0,15 
Belgium 23,5 24,9 26,4 25,9 (1995) 28,7 0,06 0,04 0,27 
France 20,8 25,1 29,2 25,9 29,2 0,31 0,19 0,14 
Germany 22,7 22,3 26,7 24,9 (1991) 27,6 0,20 0,20 0,19 
Greece 10,2 16,5 20,5 19,2 (1995) 23,6 0,31 0,32 0,41 
Italy 18,0 19,9 25,0 23,0 25,7 0,21 0,35 0,11 
Portugal 10,2 12,9 23,1 19,1 23,8 0,57 0,67 0,58 
Spain 15,5 19,9 21,2 19,3 20,4 0,21 -0,04 -0,07 
Luxembourg 20,6 19,1 23,2 20,6 20,0 0,07 0,26 -0,03 
Netherlands 24,8 25,6 20,9 29,6 27,5 -0,27 -0,43 -0,29 
Ireland 16,7 14,9 16,7 18,0 (1995) 16,9 -0,17 -0,01 0,05 
United Kingdom 16,7 17,0 21,3 21,4 25,9 0,09 0,13 0,06 
Czech Republic   16,0 19,5 16,9 (1995) 18,1   0,24 0,15 
Hungary   21,1 22,5 20,3 (1999 21,8   0,34 0,34 
Poland   14,9 21,0 19,1 (2000) 18,8   0,03 -0,16 
Slovenia       23,2 (1996) 22,2     -0,13 
Slovak Republic   18,6 16,6 17,9 (1995) 15,3   -0,19 -0,28 
Estonia       13,8 (2000) 12,2     -0,19 
Latvia       15,0 (1997) 11,9     -0,51 
Lithuania       13,1 (1996) 12,8     -0,16 
Bulgaria       15,5 (2005) 14,5     -1,00 
Romania       12,9 (2000) 13,7     0,22 
Cyprus       14,6 (2000) 18,1     0,68 
Malta       15,8 (1995) 17,9     0,13 
 
Sources: OECD 2009: Social expenditure database. The OECD keeps changing data on the web. This 
table is based on data found in May 2009. Eurostat 2009: ESSPROS. Trends: Own calculations based on: 
OECD 2009: Social expenditure database and Eurostat 2009: ESSPROS 
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More fine-grained indicators of the composition of social spending 
The data collection of the OECD allows an over-all examination of the private share in 
social spending as well as more specific analyses for the fields of pensions and health 
care. Based on the OECD distinction between gross and net social spending, Table 4 
shows the percentage of GDP (at factor cost) spent privately and voluntarily for social 
purposes for those countries for which there are time series data. Even though private 
social spending has recently grown in all European countries, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom are the only European countries that moved closer to the United States 
where private spending on welfare kept increasing further. In 2005, private social 
spending in the United States amounted to roughly 10 % of GDP, whereas the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands were the only European countries beside Belgium with 
private GDP shares above 3 %.14  
 
 
Table 4: The share of voluntary private social expenditure 1993 and 2005 
 (as % of GDP at factor cost) 
 
Country 
1993 except for Italy 
(1997) and France 
(2001) 
2005 Increase 
USA 7,8 9,8 2,0 
GB 3,2 6,0 2,8 
NL 3,4 6,2 2,8 
DE 1,5 1,8 0,4 
IT 0,1 0,6 0,5 
FR 2,1 2,9 0,8 
DK 0,4 1,5 1,1 
SE 1,0 1,8 0,8 
 
Source: Adema/ Einerhand 1998, Adema 2001, Adema/ Ladaique 2005  
More refined data showing the proportion of social spending for selected purposes are 
available for pension and health in the OECD data collection. Following the OECD 
data, most European countries have increased the private share in pension outlays over 
the past decades (Table 5). Only five countries – Finland, Austria, Portugal, Spain, and 
Luxembourg – were exempt from this general trend. As the measures of dispersion 
show, nation-specific differences within Europe did not diminish, but even increased. 
Although some European countries such as the Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
paralleled U.S. developments, the gap separating the U.S. from the (West) European 
                                                 
14  2005 data are available for 17 European countries, but time series are only available for the countries 
in the table.  
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average increased, because the U.S. continued to pursue the privatization of pensions 
much more vigorously than most European nations. In line with the notion of path de-
pendency, countries which departed from higher levels of privatization at the beginning 
of the period also tended to have a steeper trend increase of the private share (r = 0.43). 
Hence we see a fairly general trend of a “risk shift” in favour of private provisions as 
described by Hacker (2006) for the USA, but within Europe we find continuing diver-
sity rather than convergence. 
 
 
Table 5: The private share of pension expenditure  
 Mandatory + voluntary private social expenditure for pensions as percentage of total  
 (public + private) social expenditure for pensions (shaded = growing) 
Country 
(earliest year if not 1980) 
1980 
or earliest year 2005 
Trends 1980-2006 
(b coefficients) 
United States 19,7 41,8 0,84 
EU-15 9,9 13,9 0,16 
NMS-4 2,4 6,8 0,34 
EU-191 8,7 12,7 0,19 
Standard deviation  
EU-15 (EU-19)1 9,4 (9,0) 14,1 (13,2)  
Coeff. var. EU-15  
(EU-19)1 0,9 (1,0) 1,0 (1,0)  
Denmark 15,7 23,4 0,33 
Finland (1993) 4,3 2,3 -0,15 
Sweden 12,5 17,2 0,24 
Austria 5,7 3,8 -0,02 
Belgium 4,8 27,3 0,95 
France 2,6 1,8 0,03 
Germany 4,8 5,9 0,05 
Greece (1983) 0,0 3,6 0,22 
Italy 10,0 10,1 0,02 
Portugal 5,9 2,32 -0,19 
Spain 0,0 0,0 -0,02 
Luxembourg (2001) 9,3 7,1 -0,60 
Netherlands 19,7 38,9 0,77 
Ireland 18,2 21,6 0,36 
United Kingdom 35,4 43,5 0,35 
Czech Republic (1996) 0,0 2,6 0,23 
Hungary    
Poland (1990) 4,1 10,4 0,36 
Slovak Republic (1995) 3,1 7,5 0,43 
Own calculations based on: OECD Social Expenditure database 2009 
1 EU-19 without Hungary 
2 2004 
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Table 6: The private share of health expenditure  
 Mandatory + voluntary private social expenditure for health as percentage of total  
 (public + private) social expenditure for health (shaded = growing) 
 
Country 
(earliest year if not 1980) 
1980 
or earliest year 2005 
Trends 1980-2006  
(b coefficients) 
United States 41,8 45,4 0,08 
EU-15 4,5 7,8 0,11 
NMS-4 0,4 0,9 0,09 
EU-19 3,8 6,6 0,10 
Standard deviation  
EU-15 (EU-19) 3,8 (3,8)
1 6,1 (6,1)1  
Coeff. var. EU-15 (EU-19) 0,9 (1,0)1 0,8 (0,9)1  
Denmark 1,3 2,3 0,05 
Finland 1,7 2,9 0,07 
Sweden    
Austria 10,0 6,6 -0,22 
Belgium (2003) 6,4 6,5 0,07 
France 6,6 15,3 0,33 
Germany 6,9 11,3 0,16 
Greece (2000) 4,5 3,6 -0,26 
Italy (1990) 0,8 1,2 0,01 
Portugal 0,0 5,6 0,23 
Spain 3,9 7,7 0,11 
Luxembourg (1999) 1,5 2,5 0,24 
Netherlands 13,2 23,1 0,35 
Ireland 4,5 7,9 0,08 
United Kingdom 1,5 12,8 0,27 
Czech Republic (2002) 0,3 0,3 0,00 
Hungary (1999) 0,1 1,5 0,25 
Poland (2002) 0,7 0,8 0,02 
Slovak Republic    
 
Source: Calculated from OECD Social Expenditure database 2009 
1 EU-15 without Sweden, EU-19 without Sweden and Slovak Republic 
 
Measured by the private share in total outlays for health, the health care systems were 
subject to a similar, but less pronounced trend of privatization (Table 6). In West Euro-
pean countries the average private share increased from 4.5 to 7.8 %, but as the United 
States expanded its private share further, the gap separating Europe and America did not 
diminish. Whereas almost half of total health outlays in the U.S. is ranked as private by 
the OECD, the Netherlands is the only European country with a share exceeding 20 %, 
and only three more countries – France, Germany, and the United Kingdom – surpass 
the ten per cent mark. In contrast to the pension systems there is no path dependency in 
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the sense that countries which departed from higher levels in the 1980s also had steeper 
increases of privatization (r = -.08). Only three European countries – Austria, Greece, 
and the Czech Republic – were exempted from the general trend toward more private 
provisions. Judged by the coefficient of variation, European countries became a bit 
more similar on somewhat higher levels of privatisation, but as the standard deviation 
increased, it would be exaggerated to interpret this as convincing evidence of conver-
gence towards the model of greater private responsibility represented by the United 
States.  
Scholars of different leanings such as Neil Gilbert (2002) and Bo Rothstein (1998) 
agree in the belief that Europe witnessed a move toward selective needs-tested programs 
since the early 1990s. Gilbert arrived at his diagnosis of a trend from “universal to se-
lective” benefits by counting social provisions with income-limits as part of targeted 
benefits. As long as income-limits do not fall below average earnings but exclude only 
those on the very top, the term “targeted” or “selective” benefits would in my opinion 
better be reserved to programs that are targeted on the poor and involve means-tests in 
the sense of an administrative investigation into the living conditions of the households 
that the recipients of public benefits live in. Following this concept – which does not 
count compulsory insurance schemes with income-limits as targeted –, Table 7 based on 
Eurostat-data15 shows how the proportion of selective benefits changed over time. 
The average share of selective benefits is below 8 % in the enlarged EU and thus 
well below the American level even if Medicaid is excluded from the calculation of 
selective benefits in the U.S. Over time the share of selective benefits slightly decreased 
in Europe on average, and the number of countries with a shrinking importance of tar-
geted benefits as indicated by the negative trend coefficients is higher (15) than the 
number of countries with increases (11). In this sense, Europe has not moved closer to 
the American model, and the gap separating the EU average from the U.S. has grown. 
Traditionally, only Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Malta had double digit shares of 
selective schemes coming close to the U.S., but none of them approximated the Ameri-
can model further in recent years. With the exception of Poland, Slovenia, and Cyprus 
the new member states of the EU belong to the countries with shrinking proportions of 
targeted schemes. In sum, there is no convincing evidence that would sustain the notion 
that EU member states are moving away from the ideal of universal welfare states to-
wards selective benefits. As the shrinking measures of dispersion indicate, European 
countries have become more similar in this respect and tended to converge on slightly 
lower levels of selectivity, thus widening the gap that differentiates them from the 
United States.    
                                                 
15  The American figures are not strictly comparable and based on the U.S. official statistics shown in 
figure 4.  
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Table 7: The share of selective benefits in social expenditure 
 (% of total public social expenditure, shaded = growing) 
 
Country 
(earliest year if not 1990) 
1990 
or earliest year 
2005/06 Trends 1980-2005/06 
(b coefficients) 
USA 
25,2 
(11,3 without Medi-
caid) 
30,4 
(10,4 without Medi-
caid) 
0,00 
EU-15 9,4 9,4 -0,03 
NMS 8,1 6,0 -0,20 
EU-27 8,8 7,9 -0,11 
Standard deviation  
EU-15 (EU-27) 7,2 (6,5) 5,9 (5,5)  
Coeff. of var.  
EU-15 (EU-27) 0,8 (0,7) 0,6 (0,7)  
DK 2,6 3,0 0,02 
FI 11,5 9,8 -0,10 
SE 6,3 2,9 -0,36 
AT 3,9 6,7 0,20 
BE 2,7 3,7 0,07 
FR 11,0 11,9 0,07 
DE 8,6 12,2 0,07 
GR 6,2 7,6 0,17 
IT 4,7 4,6 0,00 
PT 6,2 11,5 0,32 
ES 13,6 13,1 -0,09 
LU 6,3 3,0 -0,28 
NL 9,6 11,9 0,23 
IE 31,0 24,3 -0,67 
GB 16,5 15,5 -0,17 
CZ (1995) 8,9 5,2 -0,25 
HU (1999) 7,3 4,6 -0,36 
PL (2000) 5,0 5,2 0,20 
SK (1995) 15,3 5,4 -0,88 
SL (1996) 8,8 9,7 0,14 
EE (2000) 2,5 0,8 -0,33 
LT (1996) 4,4 2,1 -0,15 
LV (1997) 2,1 1,5 -0,06 
BG (2005) 6,6 6,1 -0,52 
RO (2000) 8,1 5,1 -0,06 
CY (2000) 5,9 8,9 0,48 
MT (1995) 22,5 17,9 -0,55 
 
Own calculations based on: Eurostat 2009: ESSPROS, for the USA calculated from the Statisti-
cal Abstract of the USA 2009, Table 521 
Country abbreviations: AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, BG: Bulgaria, CY: Cyprus, CZ: Czech Repub-
lic, DK: Denmark, DE: Germany, EE: Estonia, ES: Spain, FI: Finland, FR: France, GB: Great 
Britain, GR: Greece, HU: Hungary, IE: Ireland, IT: Italy, LT: Lithuania, LU: Luxembourg, LV: 
Latvia, NL: Netherlands, MT: Malta, PL: Poland, PT: Portugal, RO: Romania, SE: Sweden, SK: 
Slovakia, SL: Slovenia, USA: United States of America 
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In sum, we do find traces of an Americanization of European social policies with re-
spect to a growing importance of private expenditure for social purposes, but not with 
respect to the importance of selective schemes. Of course, implementing change takes 
time, so that a more significant transformation may perhaps be found with respect to the 
policy discourse which will only affect change with a time lag that the available data do 
not yet capture.  
The changing policy discourse: Three aspects of Americanization in 
Europe and two aspects of Europeanization in the U.S. 
Up to the point covered by the most recent data, the actual transformation of European 
welfare states has remained rather limited, but a more profound change did take place 
on the level of social policy discourse. Three elements that used to be identified with the 
American model and have always played a stronger role in the U.S. than in Europe have 
recently come to prominence also on this side of the Atlantic: a new emphasis on indi-
vidual responsibility, a new interest in the private supply of services and more consumer 
choice, and a new emphasis on the activation of people at working age. 
Up to the early 1990s the idea that the welfare state might be the problem rather than 
the solution found little echo among policy makers outside the Thatcherite European 
political right which had adopted the American idea that welfare benefits may involve 
perverse incentives inviting people to live at the expense of others. This changed in the 
early 1990s when the European Commission issued a set of Green and White Papers 
that highlighted the adverse effects of social benefits and called for a redirection of eco-
nomic and social policy in the EU. The Commission made it clear that non wage-labour 
costs such as income taxes and social insurance contributions should be reduced, that 
traditional policies had become unsustainable, and that public expenditure should be 
channelled from social consumption to productive investment. Frequently referring to 
the United States (and Japan) as a model, the Commission called for a more active as-
sumption of responsibility by each individual, for the introduction of pay-per-use sys-
tems and for a transfer of services from the state to the market. In sum, the responsibil-
ity of the state was to be curtailed while individual responsibility was to be extended 
(Kuper 1994). Together with the impact of the World Bank and the IMF, the views of 
the Commission shaped the pre-accession policy discourse in the post-socialist trans-
formation countries to a large extent. While the European Council meetings in Laeken 
2001 and Barcelona 2002 put a transitory emphasis on the virtues of social inclusion 
and the European social model, the 2005 Review of the Lisbon Agenda put the empha-
sis once again on employment, growth, and competitiveness.  
The new emphasis on individual responsibility combined with a second discourse on 
the proper balance between the public and private supply of services which was fuelled 
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by a growing demand for more consumer choice. The expansion of higher education 
contributed to a growing number of people who called experts’ judgments into question 
and developed a preference for differentiated services rather than standardized univer-
salistic solutions (Rothstein 1998). Traditional notions of solidarity were thus increas-
ingly fused with a quest for new public/private mixes which would offer clients chances 
of voice and exit.  
Partly in response to such changing citizen demands, national governments as well as 
the European Commission set the privatization of public services on the agenda of 
European politics. In Sweden, the bourgeois parties that were in power in the early 
1990s called for a “freedom of choice revolution” that would empower the dependent 
clients of state services by transforming them into self-confident modern customers 
(Rothstein 1998). In the case of child-birth, for example, there has been a sea change in 
favour of parents’ choice which Rothstein (1998: 190) summarizes as the change from 
giving birth on the hospital’s terms to giving birth on the parents’ terms. While in Swe-
den an Agency for Administrative Development was set up to evaluate the various free-
dom of choice models, other countries followed suit in developing models for a “new 
public management” that would give citizens a greater say in their dealing with public 
bureaucracies (see also Giddens 1998). 
A third element in the changing policy discourse that could be considered a form of 
Americanization is the new emphasis on activation and work incentives to which Neil 
Gilbert (2002) has convincingly drawn attention. In Britain, for example, the Labour 
government issued a Green Paper on Welfare Reform in 1998 which declared that “the 
Government’s aim is to rebuild the welfare state around work.” (Gilbert 2002: 65). 
France introduced a new minimum income scheme – Revenu Minimum d’Insertion – in 
1988 and required the participants to sign a contract of rehabilitation worked out with 
the local administration. In Denmark the social assistance reform of 1997 introduced an 
element of workfare by requiring all beneficiaries to participate in formulating individ-
ual action plans and by introducing a 20 % benefit reduction in case an offer of activa-
tion was refused. In the Netherlands “work, work, work” became the motto of the pur-
ple coalition government under Prime Minister Kok in the mid-1990s. Its 1996 Social 
Assistance Act restricted access to welfare benefits, activated those on the rolls and al-
tered the level of benefits (Gilbert 2002: 74). An article published in World Politics in 
2001 could still wonder “why welfare reform happened in Denmark and the Netherlands 
but not in Germany” (Cox 2001), but in 2002 the German coalition government headed 
by the social democrats followed the Dutch example by adopting the so-called Hartz 
reform which ended welfare as we knew it in Germany by partly fusing the social assis-
tance scheme with the unemployment compensation scheme and by abolishing the enti-
tlement to social assistance for able-bodied people at working age who were put under 
heavier pressure to actively seek work. 
It may be exaggerated to declare the new emphasis on the activation of people at 
working age as a process of “re-commodification” in European welfare states, as Neil 
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Gilbert (2002) does. But in sum these new elements do signify a profound transforma-
tion of European social democracy which is of historic proportions. The European La-
bour movement has made its peace with the capitalist market economy and parliamen-
tary democracy in three major steps. The first step occurred in the course of the revi-
sionism debate around the turn of the 19th century which led to the renouncing of revo-
lution, the acceptance of parliamentary democracy and a strategy of piecemeal democ-
ratic reform. The second step was taken in the 1950s when the idea of public investment 
control and of nationalizing key industries was given up and the market economy was 
accepted as a growth machine and as an efficient form of allocating investments. The 
third step was taken now around the turn of the century, when the idea of limiting the 
sphere of market influence by extended public services and benefits which would partly 
“de-commodify” citizens through giving them access to means of livelihood outside the 
market was abandoned in favour of the new goal to empower as many people as possi-
ble to participate in markets. Making people fit for the market has now become the 
motto of “New Labour” and of a transformed social democracy, as inclusion into work 
is declared to be the ultimate form of empowerment (Giddens 2001). In some respects 
European countries have thus become more similar to the work-conditioned welfare 
state of the U.S.16  
The new orientation has not been confined to the policy discourse, but has trickled 
down into re-shaping social reality. Practically all European countries have sizeably 
increased employment rates in recent years. Moving closer to the goal of full employ-
ment was not only seen as an avenue to social inclusion, but also as a functional impera-
tive given the increasing demographic burden on pension systems and the need to pro-
mote the viability and sustainability of public pensions. Figure 9 shows that with the 
exception of four countries all European countries have recently increased employment 
and been moving closer to the United States in this respect. The fact that Scandinavian 
countries have particularly high employment rates, shows, however, that the idea of 
activation is not only enshrined in the American but also in the Scandinavian version of 
the welfare state (Alber 2008; Eichhorst and Hemerijck 2009). 
 
 
                                                 
16  The transformation from old to new labour is particularly visible in the development of Esping-
Andersen’s writings (from Esping-Andersen 1990 to Esping-Andersen 1999 and Esping-Andersen et 
al. 2002. His new typologies still follow the “good, bad, ugly” scheme to which Philip Manow (2002) 
has drawn attention, but only the Scandinavian countries classify constantly as “good” in the de-
commodification dimension as well as in his new de-familialization dimension. The liberal former 
British Colonies now improve from “bad” (due to residual de-commodification) to “ugly” (high fe-
male employment, but only in the private sector), whereas the Continental European countries move 
from their “ugly” position in the original de-commodification typology to “bad” with respect to the 
insufficient insertion of everybody including women into the labor market leading to a low degree of 
de-familialization. 
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Figure 9: The change in employment rates, 1995*-2006
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The United States have further strengthened some of the key aspects of the American 
social policy model by increasing the private share in pensions and health, by expanding 
“the hidden welfare state” of tax credits, by shifting from defined benefit plans for pen-
sions to tax deductible individual savings accounts, and by extending their targeted pro-
grams (Hacker 2006). However, the U.S. did not become more radically American 
throughout, but has in some respects even approximated Europe in recent years. This is 
true for the development of health insurance where both major public health care pro-
grams – Medicare and Medicaid – were successively widened, and also for the change 
in American attitudes on public policies even before the present financial crisis began. 
Health care may be the central field where American social policies converge towards 
Europe. Taken together Medicare and Medicaid have more than doubled their GDP 
share from 2.2 % in 1980 to 5.4 % in 2006. The Obama administration is now deter-
mined to make another attempt at health care reform with coverage for all Americans, 
and various policy advisors have drafted plans for a reform that would avoid the errors 
of Clinton’s failed initiative (Hacker 2009; Executive Office of the President 2009). 
There is also some change in American political attitudes. Based on surveys succes-
sively asking identical questions, the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press 
has recently published a report on “Trends in Political Values and Core Attitudes: 1987-
2007”. This report shows that a solid two thirds majority of Americans “strongly fa-
vour” or “favour” “the U.S. government guaranteeing health insurance for all citizens, 
even if it means raising taxes.” (The Pew Research Center 2007, p. 70). The majority of 
those favouring an increase in the minimum wage varied between 80 and 87 % between 
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1998 and 2007 (Ibid.) A two thirds majority now agrees with the statement “It is the 
responsibility of the government to take care of people who can’t take care of them-
selves” (Pew, p. 12). The gap between those agreeing and those disagreeing with this 
statement reached a nadir of 16 percentage points at the height of the debate about 
“Ending welfare as we know it” in 1994, but has since grown to 41 percentage points in 
2007, as 69 % endorse and only 28 % deny the government’s responsibility. In the pol-
icy discourse, then, we see some convergence on the two sides of the Atlantic even be-
fore the onset of the financial crisis made for a more pragmatic approach geared to more 
policy learning from countries facing similar problems.  
Conclusion  
Our comparison of American and European social policies shed doubt on the usefulness 
of the concept of a residual welfare state as applied to the United States. It was shown 
that the United States and Europe have more in common than the traditional distinction 
between “residual” and “institutional-redistributive” welfare states and the talk about 
widely discrepant social models suggest. Yet there are also persisting differences which 
include the higher reliance on work-conditioned benefits, on selective targeted schemes, 
and on private welfare measures in the United States. While selective benefits have not 
gained prominence in Europe, but remained rather marginal, private schemes have be-
come more important, and “activation” has become a key word in European social poli-
cies. In this sense, Neil Gilbert (2002) was correct when he diagnosed a move from so-
cial protection to the idea of an enabling state. The idea of activating social policies 
forms, however, as much part of the Scandinavian as of the American social policy tra-
dition so that a stronger emphasis on work incentives and full employment need not 
necessarily indicate an “Americanization” of European social policies and much will 
depend on the concrete implementation of specific policy programmes. Thus far, the 
basic transformation of European social policies has been on the level of ideas rather 
than on the level of institutional structures. While the basic structures of European wel-
fare states have remained largely intact and were even combined with increased social 
spending in many cases, the idée directrice of European social policies and the political 
elites shaping them has changed from social protection to activation. A fairly persistent 
institutional structure has thus been combined with a new culture or spirit. Perhaps a 
combination of European welfare state structures and the American idea of individual 
responsibility represents even the best of all possible worlds.  
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